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IN 2014 THE QUARTER-CENTURY OF THE COLD PEACE FROM 1989 came to an end, and the continent was 
forced to come to terms with the harsh reality that the idealism and aspirations vested in the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the destruction of the ‘Iron Curtain’ had not been fulfilled. Instead of the creation of a 
‘common European home’, as advanced by the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, in Strasburg in July
1989, or the alternative but putatively complementary vision of one Europe ‘whole and free’, as articulated 
in the ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe’ (OSCE 1990), the continent was once again divided. In fact, the 
roots of the later breakdown lie in the contrasting ideological projects embedded in these two formulations. 
On the one hand, although Gorbachev admitted that he was uncertain about the new ‘architecture of our 
“common home”’, he insisted that it would have many rooms (Gorbachev 1989). His model suggested a 
pluralistic Europe of diverse social systems and state orders coexisting peacefully, united in what was later 
formulated as the ‘greater Europe’ idea of some sort of pan-continental community stretching from Lisbon 
to Vladivostok.  
The idea was not unique to Russia and has been expressed in various forms by European thinkers 
and leaders over the years, but its elucidation could have become the great Eu opean project of the late 
twentieth century. This is a dialogical model of post-Cold War politics based on a transformative agenda, in 




contestation between East and West and of the ideological conflict between capitalist democracy and 
revolutionary socialism. By contrast, the ideology underlying ‘Europe whole and free’ became clear only 
later, and entailed not transformation but a logic of enlargement: initially of a normative sphere, but later 
reinforced by the physical enlargement of the Atlantic community as instantiated by the European Union 
(EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Sakwa 2017a). Thiswas part of the broader 
failure to achieve a transformation of post-Cold War world order, with Russia once again becoming the 
‘other’ to the Atlantic system and the US-led liberal international order. With the perceived failure of the 
aspirations vested in greater Europe, which from Moscow’s perspective would have required the ‘pan-
Europeanisation’ of strategic security issues accompanied by the emergence of Europe as an indepe dent 
actor on the world stage, Russia from 2012 took the lead in creating the sinews of a ‘post-Western’ world 
order (Stuenkel 2016). 
This commentary takes an interpretive look at how Europe once again became divided, and how 
the unique historical opportunity to transform European international relations at the end of the Cold War 
was lost. It also notes that the historical situation has once again become increasingly fluid, and the nearly 
three-decades-long stasis following the Cold War is now being broken by the confluence of many factors, 
including the election of a radical mercantilist to the White House in November 2016. In response to the 
unilateralism of President Donald J. Trump, European leaders such Angela Merkel in Germany and 
Emmanuel Macron in France are now calling for greater European ‘str tegic autonomy’, in the words of the 
EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS) (European Union 2016), adopted by the European Council on 28 June 2016. 
We are once again entering a liminal period, of the sort that appears to shape the destiny of Europe once a 
generation. The erosion of accustomed patterns of Atlantic solidarity in recent years provides an 
opportunity for institutional development and ideational innovation in Europe, although the weakening of 
the normative bonds of post-Cold War community signals the return of some old problems.  
 
Monism and enlargement 
The Russian narrative argues that at the end of the Cold War the country was once again left out in the 
cold. The idea of ‘greater Europe’ for Moscow represented a mechanism to achieve pan-European 




unmediated enlargement of an already constituted ‘historical West’. Whatever its virtues, the expansion of 
a normative and security order did not resolve the problem of Russian territoriality, and indeed appeared to 
threaten the country’s domestic coherence and its foreign policy standing (Tsygankov 2014). By 2014 it 
was clear, despite efforts to soften the exclusion, that there was no way f r Russia to be assimilated into the 
existing structures of Euro-Atlantic security. Russia was too big, too independent, too proud and ultimately 
too strong to become part of an expanded historical West. Russia’s geopolitical concerns and sense of itself 
as a great power meant that it could not easily be subsumed into the Atlantic West. In the early post-Cold 
War years, Russia was ready to adapt to the exigencies of the world order represented by the Atlantic 
community, but in the end the adaptation demands proved too high. In particular, the Russian elite resisted 
‘Europeanisation’ when it was defined as conforming to EU conditionality (Kratochvíl 2008).  
Russia nevertheless continued to defend a more pluralistic type of Eurpeanisation, just as it 
sought the transformation of the historical West into a greater West, a community tra sformed by the 
presence of Russia’s vast civilisational, strategic and material potential. The reluctance of the West to 
accept such a transformation is understandable, given that all that was on immediate offer was an 
economically devastated country with grave governance problems. These probl ms were recognised by the 
more enlightened part of the Russian leadership, but they insisted that they would deal with them in their 
own time and in their own way (Surkov 2010). The transformative power of Europeanisation through 
conditionality had reached its limits (Grabbe 2006). The difference between th  two logics of integration—
transformation versus enlargement—in the end led to estrangement. Russia increasingly felt trapped in a 
strategic impasse in which it could neither join NATO nor the EU, yet its own space for sovereign 
development and great power interests were stymied. The quarter-century of he c ld peace gave way to 
resistance and conflict. 
This is where the concept of monism can help to elucidate the underlying structural basis to the 
renewed contestation between Russia and the Atlantic West. Monism is the classic metaphysical view in 
philosophy that there is only one basic substance or principle as the basis of reality. It is usually contrasted 
with dualism or pluralism. In history monism means that there is one verriding causal factor that 
determines behaviour. Here the term is applied in a rather more limited manner, meaning the view that 




in the form of a puzzle: ‘why liberal modernity can’t live with any principle of order other than itself’ 
(Grenier 2015). In practical terms in the post-Cold War era, this means the merger of geopolitics and 
democratisation into a single expansive power system (Sakwa 2017a, pp. 98-104). Olga Baysha argues, on 
the basis of a study of social movements in the late Soviet period, Euromaidan an  the White Ribbon 
movement in Russia that ‘the “progressive” imaginary, which envisages progress in the unidirectional 
terms of catching up with the “more advanced” Western condition, is inherently anti-democratic and deeply 
antagonistic’ (Baysha,2019, p. xi), The corollary is that societies or states that resist are deviant in one way 
or another, and will sooner or later suffer the consequences. Democratic peace th ory and various models 
of democracy promotion are manifestations of a fundamentally monist appreciation of international affairs. 
The unifying principle is not that of the ‘common good’, but of the adaptation (and ultimately 
subordination) of the outsider to the norms and power conventions of the enlarging order. The ‘diabolical’ 
(divisive) character of liberal modernity is not transcended, but instead suppressed through neo-imperial 
enlargement (Schindler 2017).  
In contemporary Europe the philosophical character of political monism is harnessed to an 
expansive geopolitical dynamic in which the monadic power system reinforces an increasingly singular 
model of development. Normative power is itself a form of hegemony (Diez 2013). The monist moment is 
redefining the West itself, which in the regional context means the Atlantic community and its allies 
(Browning & Lehti 2010). The failure to establish a greater West means that everything outside the old 
West becomes problematic. The very notion of ‘subaltern’ introduces hierarchy into a relationship that the 
greater Europe model of post-Cold War order suggests is structurally equal (Morozov 2015). The 
recalcitrant states, above all Russia, responded by devising new patterns of resistance. In  lassically 
paradoxical manner, monism gives rise to new forms of pluralism. However, accustomed forms of 
diplomacy do not operate as they once did in this new form of contestation between an enlarging monist 
system and the defenders of a pluralistic international order who fail to formulate a normatively attractive 
alternative other than the principle of pluralism itself. Relations between the EU and Russia became 
didactic and historicist (Prozorov 2016), assuming that the solutions devised in Western Europe were 
applicable to a country with intense security concerns and a very different historical experience. This is 




the first Cold War, two readily comprehensible and historically rooted conceptions of progress and 
international politics—capitalist democracy and revolutionary socialism—battled it out; in the second, 
there is no common ontological perception of reality to structure interactions nor are there any customary 
practices to regulate the conflict.  
Contemporary European monism is rooted in a number of processes, here presented schematically. 
First, the way that the Cold War ended allowed ultimately the imposition of a triumphal ‘victory’ discourse 
on what had been assumed by the Soviet and, later, the Russian side to be a common victory. The turning 
point was the Malta Summit of December 1989, at which the Soviet and US leaders decided the fate of 
Europe. The absence of a West European leader is indicative of the way that Europe failed to gain a 
substantive independent political subjectivity in the post-Cold War years. As at Yalta nearly half a century 
earlier, the great powers held the fate of Europe in their hands, but Malta registered the change in the 
diplomatic and strategic balance of power. The Soviet side hoped to register politics of positive 
transcendence, based on the idea that the end of the Cold War was a common victory that would allow a 
new era of cooperative politics (Cohen 2009; Matlock 1995, 2004, 2010). Gorbachev, as we have seen, 
sought a new European order that would be geopolitically multipolar and ideationally plural. Instead of a
positive transcendence of the Cold War, in practice a negative version was achieved that simply registered 
a power shift rather than a transformation in the nature of power in Europe (Itzkowiz-Shifrinson 2013). The 
potential for combining multiplicity with unity was lost (Biebuyck & Rumford 2012). The absence of an 
overarching mode of European integration provoked the clash of two partial projects, precipitating the 
renewed division of the continent. 
Second, the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975 eventually elevated human rights to the centre of 
European international politics. Helsinki confirmed Yalta, above all, the borders established in 1945 and 
the framework for the conduct of relations between the great powers, but at the same time Helsinki’s ‘third 
basket’ of human rights commitments provided a mechanism for the transcendence of Yalta. The Malta 
agreements built on the Helsinki Final Act and were codified in the Charter of Paris. Helsinki established a 
particular method for Yalta’s transcendence, which itself ultimately proved corrosive of post-Cold War 
international order. This was a values-based agenda, which provided a powerful platform for East European 




agreed. These were values to which both Gorbachev and Boris Yel’t in were committed, but the framework 
for their advancement in the post-Cold War years became monist rather than pluralist, sustaining a mode of 
discourse that tended to delegitimate the political subjectivity of the interlocutor (Geis 2013). Human rights 
became part of the substantive discourse in relations between states, displacing more traditional forms of 
diplomacy. Democracy promotion and ‘colour revolutions’ may well be responses to modernisation 
challenges, but when embedded as part of an expansive power system they are inevitably subsumed into the 
reproduced zero-sum logic of Cold War politics n which ‘everyone loses’ (Charap & Colton 2016). As 
realists have long argued, the struggle for democracy and human rights does not stand outside power 
relations. Pragmatic US leadership ‘transformed into a much more uncompromising mindset of missionary 
zeal’ (Mazarr & Koffman 2018, p. 107). The contradiction between ends and means discredited the whole 
process and normal diplomatic intercourse between nations was distorted by normative agendas (Geuss 
2008).  
The third factor shaping the monism of the cold peace and its ultimate degeneration into renewed 
confrontation is the failure of Europe to assume an independent political subjectivity. In the post-
communist era there was much talk of the EU as a postmodern polity in which rules, regulations and norms 
take precedence over diplomacy, power and coercion (Ruggie 1993). This can be couched otherwise in 
terms of a tension between the horizons of time and space, in which the reconfiguration of territory 
reshapes political identities (Borg & Diez 2016). This has been taken further in suggesting a sharp division 
between the EU’s postmodernity and the recalcitrant outsiders who remain locked in modernist ways of 
thinking (Cooper 1998, 2003). While the logic of norm diffusion operates for the former, the language of 
power and coercion is exercised against the latter. This is precisely the probl m of involution (see below). 
The EU’s civilian power is embedded in a larger Atlantic security system, in which traditional practices of 
security politics still reign supreme. The EU turned out to be the velvet g ove over the mailed fist of the 
Atlantic power system (Mearsheimer 2014). This duality only intensified Russia’s strategic impasse, since 
engaging with the EU is not necessarily the same as that needed to engage with NATO.  
Fourth, the monism of the Atlantic system is diverse in form. From Moscow’s perspective, the 
Atlantic community talks in two discursive registers: first, the EU’s post-Westphalian discourse of 




typically couched in the language of norms and values. Understandably, it is hard to establish a stable 
relationship with such a hydra-headed entity. Discourse shifts from power to values, interests to norms, in 
an endlessly protean manner. It is not clear how dialogue can be maintained with a community that 
simultaneously speaks the language of liberal internationalism and coercive hegemony. The very notion of 
‘spheres of influence’ has been delegitimated, while the ‘liberal international order’ acts as if the world is 
an extended arena for its universalistic ethos. The Monroe doctrine is effectiv ly limitless, and the universal 
sphere of influence appears intolerant of those beyond. In the 1990s the EU embarked on a ‘civilising 
mission’ to tame its wild eastern marches (Zielonka 2013). This monist and expansive Atlantic system 
(what in the original Cold War was known as ‘the West’) was endowed with some of the characteristics of 
earlier imperial systems analysed by postcolonial thinkers, in which others are assigned to the waiting room 
of history until called into the sunlit uplands of Western modernity (Chakrabarty 2000).  
The response in Russia has been to emphasise its civilisational specificity (Maslovskiy 2016). 
Russia once again presents itself as the champion of the ‘true’ Europe against the ‘false’ Europe locked in 
Atlantic structures (Neumann 2016). Specifically, although Gorbachev’s concept of the common European 
home was vague on details, the fundamental argument is clear: ‘What we have in mind is a restructuring of 
the international order existing in Europe that would put the European common values in the forefront and 
make it possible to replace the traditional balance of forces with a balance of interests’ (Gorbachev 1989). 
The interests at stake were those of the sovereign states making up Europe,now united in their diversity but 
committed to the creation of a new political community. Greater Europe was a programme for geopolitical 
and normative pluralism while avoiding a return to the balance of power politics that had kept the continent 
in thrall for so long (Gromyko & Fëdorova 2014). Gorbachev eloquently and forcefully argued that 
different systems could coexist peacefully. In his Council of Europe spe ch and later, Gorbachev called for 
the transcendence of both Yalta and Malta. He sought to create a new type of European international 
relations that encompassed the interests of both the small and great powers (Gorbachev & Ikeda 2005). 
This was to be a multipolar Europe with room for experimentation and diversity, representing a space in the 
greater West in which Russia would be a co-founder of a new and more coop rative political order. 
Instead, the EU effectively claimed to be the sole legitimate voice of Europe, although in 




operation in Europe (OSCE). This is the ‘smaller Europe’ project, embedded in the broader Atlantic 
community (Gromyko 2015). This monist vision of Europe, until recently, had been unable to imagine any 
substantive alternative political, let alone ideational, community. Just as liberalism in the post-Cold War era 
finds it hard to accept alternatives to its own hegemony and thus erodes its own liberality, so the smaller 
Europe (and the Atlantic community of which it is part) has not been able to find an appropriate form of 
engagement with outsiders. It was assumed that the solutions to the probl m of history in one context are 
universally applicable to others. Even if a leadership in Russia were to accept this inverted neo-Marxist 
theoretical postulate (as it did to a large extent in the Yel’tsin years), the fact that historical problems of 
territorial unity, political identity, security cooperation, economic modernisation and international 
integration have still not been resolved means that tensions, if not conflict, will inevitably arise. 
Historicism, of both the Marxist and the liberal variants, ultimately break against what Chebankova calls 
Russia’s ‘paradigmatic pluralism’ (Chebankova 2017). The complex multi-faceted civilisational entity that 
we call Russia that survives through maintaining its autonomy, although it degrades when this autonomy is 
not adequately accompanied by internal openness and external integration. The strategic impasse in which 
Russia perceived itself to be trapped for a quarter of a century meant that sooner or later it would try to 
break out, and in doing so try to find allies and to endow the endavour with some sort of ideational 
mission.  
 
Involution and stasis 
The argument presented here suggests that the root cause of the Second Cold War is the failure to provide 
an institutional or ideational framework for a continental vision of Europe (Zwolski 2016). The ‘little 
Europe’ represented by the EU claimed a normative and geographical superiority—as the embodiment of 
the ideals and aspirations of Europe ‘whole and free’ (Crouch & Marquand 1992, p. 1). These claims were 
in part justified, since the EU represents a coherent and rational response to the problems of Europe: its 
fragmentation, repeated wars and enduring conflicts, and uneven development. The EU certainly did not 
solve these problems, and the distortions of the eurozone have even exacerbated them, yet the EU 
represents one of the most successful attempts of non-imperial regional integration in human history. As a 




however, this very success has undermined its ability to achieve the same result on a continental scale. The 
EU remains at heart a functionalist enterprise, dominated by a technocratic rationality a d a bureaucratic 
mentality. This ‘rules-based’ order is the crowning achievement of European integration, substituting the 
sword with the pen, but the conditionality-driven logic of enlargement in the post-Cold War era proved 
inadequate when it came to Russia (Maas 2016).  
The ideational foundations of Russia’s hopes for structural transformation may have been ill-
judged, but in the early period they drew on a common normative framework. However, two different 
logics of integration came into conflict: technocratic enlargement versus intitutional transformation. No 
common and shared mode of integration could be found, and in the end the two sides drifted apart and then 
became deeply estranged (Forsberg & Haukkala 2016). These competing ratio alities (Averre 2009) proved 
catastrophic when it came to competition in what became known as the ‘shared neighbourhood’. The term 
itself already suggests the logic of conflict in which the countries ‘in between’ are forced to choose. The 
Ukraine conflict is the child of the cold peace and the monist pattern of politics on which it is based (Sakwa 
2017b). Instead of some sort of renegotiated settlement of the European peace order after 1989, the logic of 
enlarging existing institutions became the predominant mode of engagement. After 1989, the ‘victors’ at 
the end of the Cold War, fearing institutional weakening and normative dilution, sought to consolidate their 
victory not through transformation but through enlargement. This meant th t the EU was unable to escape 
the conditions of its birth, and remained trapped in the Atlanticist carapace. This foreclosed the EU’s 
development as a separate pole in global politics and stunted its ability to become part of a greater 
European continental agenda of peace and reconciliation. 
This is what in this paper is called ‘involution’. In the biological sciences involution occurs when 
something turns in on itself or when an organism is reduced in size, and effectively means the opposite of 
evolution. The term has been applied to help explain the Soviet collapse (Derluguian 2000) and to analyse 
the shrinkage of the Russian economy in the 1990s. Burawoy (1996) argued that the Russian economy 
eroded its own foundations by diverting resources from production to exchange. In the case of the EU, the 
involution has been a twof ld process. First, in the 1990s the question was posed in terms of ‘widening’ or 
‘deepening’, and in the end there was significant development on both, but the puative third leg was 




isation) of continental politics. Successive waves of enlargements brought t tal membership of the EU to 
28 (27 when the UK leaves) and the various treaties, from Maastricht in 1992 to Lisbon in 2009, extended 
the institutional ramifications of the EU. However, despite the spatial extension and i stitutional changes, 
including the creation of the European External Action Service, no European ‘super-state’ has been created 
(except in the imagination of Brexiteers). Second, despite the introduction of a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), security and defence remain largely national priorities, and moves to extend the 
EU’s competencies have been resisted. In the post-Cold War era, the EU has become more deeply 
embedded as one of the wings of the Atlantic system, and attempts to create an ind pe dent defence force 
or articulate a sustained independent European foreign policy have been stymied by fears that this would 
play into the hands of Moscow. This is not to say that there have not been distinctive EU policies on 
important issues, such as Palestine and Iran, but overall until the great Trumpian disruption, elements of 
Cold War bloc discipline continued to be exercised.  
The transformation of European international relations was stymied, and the predominance of the 
enlargement agenda in the end had two consequences. First, the Atlantic project was radicalised, in both 
ideological and political terms. The ‘unipolar’ moment of US hegemony, as termed by Charles 
Krauthammer (1991), was accompanied by the continuation of what during the Cold War had been called 
superpower ‘overlay’ over the western part of the continent. This was certainly comforting to the former 
Soviet bloc countries, who could now shelter under the US umbrella. However, this only perpetuated Cold 
War patterns and attitudes, and did nothing to advance the project of European unity (Parker 2019). 
Second, the EU remained trapped in the matrix in which it had been born. The EU was a child of the 
Atlantic system and had been nurtured within the framework of the Cold War contest with the Soviet Union 
(Laughland 1998). After 1989 Moscow anticipated that the EU would become the core of a new settlement 
in which superpower overlay would be a thing of the past, and Europe c uld finally gain a subjectivity and 
political voice of its own. Russia very much wanted to be part of this new order. The initial option was for 
‘little Europe’ to become a wider Europe encompassing in one way or another Russia, possibly through 
some sort of ‘strategic alliance’ (Bordachev 2009). Later, the ‘greater Europe’ agenda predominated, a 
plural Europe of the EU, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and other countries coming together to create some sort 




Atlanticism not only survived but was radicalised, with Russia once again thrown back onto its Eurasian 
heartland.  
The negative transcendence of the Cold War, in which a power shift was recognised but no 
transformation of European politics was achieved, allowed Cold War institutions and ideology to flourish, 
providing a fertile breeding ground for resentments, exclusions and renewed conflict (Sakwa 2013). 
Russia’s encouragement of EU autonomy from the United States was seen as an attempt to drive a ‘wedge’ 
between the two wings of the Atlantic alliance, stultifying pan-contine al unification. Equally, trapped in 
its Atlantic cocoon, EU development gave way to involution, in which, rather than acting as the solution to 
historical problems of peace and reconciliation on the continent, it became no ore than an instrument for 
the perpetuation and even exacerbation of traditional European divisions. In part this derived from the 
intensification of monist representation of the EU. Locked in a power system dominated by the world’s 
only surviving superpower, Atlanticism inevitably assumed features of the unipolarity of which it was part. 
Monism is the ideological consequence of the logic of expansion. EU enlargement was accompanied by the 
formulation of the normative and technical conditions required for membership, accompanied by a 
unidirectional process of change in accession countries. The didactic elements were accentuated, and 
dialogue and negotiation were thereby attenuated. 
 
Conclusion 
The predominance of a single model of normative behaviour that was considered universal was bound up 
with a power system that was unprecedented in its scope and ambition to ra sf rm the world. The issue 
here is not whether the US-led liberal international order has delivered positive public goods, because 
clearly it has, but on what terms this order engaged with outsiders (Ikenberry 2011). In the case of Russia, 
the normative aspirations of the 1990s coincided with those of the Atlantic system, but its power, status and 
security considerations did not, a gulf that in the Putin years has widened considerably. The price for 
Russia of adapting to the existing power and normative system, in terms of status, autonomy, security and 
sovereignty, was in the end considered too high. Instead, Russia increasingly advanced the structural 
pluralism associated with the notion of multipolarity (Smith 2013), while also defending the principle of 




abroad while imposing a monistic system of governance at home. In rsponse, Russia has reiterated the 
realist view that foreign policy is largely independent of the structure of domestic politics, while liberals at 
home and abroad insist on the close connection (McFaul 2018). 
Europe is once again divided, with a new ‘iron curtain’ gradually being fortified in a line from 
Narva on the Baltic to Mariupol on the Sea of Azov. A divided Europe is in danger of becoming an absence 
of Europe in international politics. Having failed to unify, it remains in danger of losing its place on the 
world stage completely. Europe as a political project has lost autonomous subjectivity, and traditional great 
powers once again predominate in the international system. The monist vision of a normatively and 
spatially enlarging Atlantic Europe and the failure to reconcile the two models of Eur pean development 
advanced at the end of the First Cold War provoked the second. Fear of m rginalisation prompted the idea 
of ‘strategic autonomy’ in the EU’s Global Strategy in 2016. The election of Trump in November of that 
year and his open hostility to the EU, accompanied by suggestions that NATO was ‘obsolete’, may, 
paradoxically, end the period of institutional and ideational involution and allow a new evolutionary 
‘Gaullist’ impulse for the European Union, once the current period of enlargement and deepening fatigue is 
overcome (Haine 2015, p. 991). The involution of Europe has entaild paralysis for the continent as a 
whole. The many Europes are diminished by the failure to articulate and institutionalise a common 
European vision for the continent from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Today the long period of institutional and 
ideational stasis following the end of the first Cold War is beginning to thaw, opening up the renewed 
possibility of embedding ‘one Europe’ in new forms of political community. 
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